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Abstract 
Inspired by the semi-quantum protocols, lightweight quantum protocols are 
defined in this paper. Subsequently, a Lightweight Mediated Quantum Key 
Distribution (LMQKD) protocol is proposed. In the proposed protocol, a dishonest 
third party (TP) with complete quantum capabilities helps two lightweight 
quantum users establish a secure key, in which the lightweight quantum users are 
allowed to perform only: (1) unitary operations and (2) reflecting qubits without 
disturbance. The proposed protocol has been showed to be robust under the 
collective attack.  
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, Semi-quantum key distribution, untrusted third-
party.   
1. Introduction 
Since the first quantum key distribution protocol—BB84 was published by Bennett 
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et al. [1] in 1984, various quantum cryptographic protocols have been proposed [2-14]. 
However, most of these protocols allow the participants to have complicate quantum 
capabilities such as generating entangled states, quantum memory and so on, though 
quantum devices are still expensive and difficult to implement to date. As a result, these 
protocols are not very practical in implementation. 
To enable “classical” participants to perform quantum protocols, Boyer et al. [15,16] 
proposed the concept of “Semi-Quantum” protocol, in which two kinds of users, the 
quantum users (or servers) and the classical users are defined. The quantum users 
usually have complete quantum capabilities, i.e., he/she can generate quantum states 
(e.g., single photon and entangled quantum states), perform measurement (e.g., X-basis, 
Z-basis, or Bell measurement), store qubits in quantum memory, and so on, whereas 
the classical users are allowed to perform only three out of four deliberately simplified 
operations, called semi-quantum operations here: (1) measuring qubits in Z basis 
{|0 , |1 }   (2) preparing qubits in Z basis (3) reordering qubits via a delay line, and (4) 
reflecting qubits without any disturbance. Based on these semi-quantum operations, 
two kinds of semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, namely Measure-
Resend and Randomization-Based SQKD protocols, were proposed in [15, 16]. Since 
then, various semi-quantum protocols and security analyses [15-25] have been 
proposed.  
The above-mentioned SQKD protocols can only let a quantum user and a classical 
user to share a secret key. In 2015, the mediated SQKD protocol, particularly allowing 
two classical users to share a secret key with the help of a dishonest quantum third party 
(TP), was proposed [26]. Later, Liu et al. [27] proposed a mediated SQKD protocol 
without invoking quantum measurement for the classical users in 2018. 
 Among these four above mentioned semi-quantum operations, photon reordering 
operation appears to be quite complicate in implementation [28]. This observation 
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motivates this paper to research into lightweight quantum protocols. To justify the 
definition of “lightweight” protocols, it is better to list the “lightweight” quantum 
operations from the most lightweight to the less ones as follows [29-30]: (1) reflecting 
qubits without disturbance, (2) performing single-qubit unitary operations, (3) 
generating qubits in Z-basis, (4) measuring qubits in Z-basis. Based on these 
lightweight quantum operations, lightweight quantum protocols can be defined as 
follows.  
Definition. Lightweight Quantum Protocol:  
A quantum protocol is called lightweight if the lightweight participants only 
perform two out of the above four mentioned lightweight quantum operations to 
complete the protocol.  
It should be noted that BB84 can be called lightweight based on this definition 
because the lightweight participant only performs the lightweight quantum operations 
(2) and (4). However, BB84 requires a quantum user to distribute a key to a lightweight 
user. To extend the applications of lightweight quantum protocols, an interesting 
question to ask is: Can we allow two lightweight quantum users to share a key with the 
help of a dishonest TP. In other words, can we design a lightweight MQKD? This work 
aims to provide a solution to this question. 
 In particular, this work tries to propose a lightweight MQKD protocol, in which 
the participants are only with two lightweight quantum operations (i.e., (1) performing 
unitary operations, (2) reflecting the qubits without disturbance). Security analyses are 
provided to prove that the proposed lightweight MQKD is robust under the collective 
attack. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the proposed 
protocol. The security analyses are described in Section 3. The comparison of our 
protocol and the existing three-party QKD protocols is provided in Section 4. Finally, 
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conclusion remarks are given in Section.5. 
2. Proposed scheme 
This section first introduces the unitary operations Z , X , H , used in our 
proposed protocol: 
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              Eq. (1) 
One can use the unitary operations to transfer the state of a qubit. For example, one 
can apply the X  operation on 0  and measure the qubit with Z-basis to get the 
1  as the measurement result. The state transitions of single photons by unitary 
operations are shown in the Table 1. 
  
Table 1 The state transitions of single photons 
 
Based on the Eq. (1) and Table 1, we can further perform the unitary operations 
on a Bell state, and the transition of the Bell state is described as follows. 
    Let 
1
| (| 00 |11 )
2
+  = +   denote a Bell state. If each qubit in this Bell state is 
performed with one of the unitary operations z  , x   or H  , respectively. The 
State 
Unitary operation 
0  1  +  −  
z  0  - 1  −  +  
x  1  0  +  −  
H  +  −  0  1  
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changed states and the combinations of unitary operations are summarized in the 
Figure 1. For example, if the first qubit is performed with z  and the second qubits is 
performed with z , then the Bell state will still be |
+   . If the first qubit of the Bell 
state is performed with z  and the second qubit of the Bell state is performed with H , 
then the Bell Measurement of this Bell state will be either | +   or | −  . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. State transition of the Bell state after performing unitary operations 
This study uses the relationship shown in Figure 1 to propose a lightweight MQKD, 
which requires the following assumptions:  
⚫ There are ideal quantum channels (i.e. noiseless and non-lossy) connected between 
TP and each participant, respectively. 
⚫ There are public classical channels connected between TP and each participant, 
respectively. 
⚫ There is an authenticated channel shared between two participants. 
⚫ The two participants can only perform (1) unitary operations, and (2) reflecting 
photons. 
⚫ The untrusted TP can perform any quantum operations and any attacks. 
The procedure of the proposed protocol is illustrated in the following (see also Figure 
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2). 
 
Figure 2. The proposed LMQKD 
Step.1 TP generates n  Bell states +  , and sends all the first and all the second 
qubits of the Bell states, 
1
iq , 2
iq , 1 i n  , one-by-one respectively to Alice 
and Bob. 
Step.2 Upon receiving a qubit, 
1
iq  ( 2
iq  ), from TP, Alice (Bob) performs a unitary 
operation randomly chosen from { Z , X , H } on the qubit to form 1 '
iq ( 2 '
iq ) 
and then sends it back to TP, 1 i n  .  
Step.3 While TP receives the two qubits respectively from Alice and Bob, TP will 
perform a Bell Measurement on the qubit pair. After measuring all these n  
qubit pairs one-by-one in order, TP will obtain n  Bell Measurement results 
MR={ 1MR ,…, MR n }, and send MR to Alice and Bob.  
Step.4 Alice and Bob first confirm receiving of the same MR. Alice and Bob will then 
disclose to each other the unitary operations performed on the qubit pairs 
respectively in order via an authenticated classical channel. If the unitary 
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operation performed on a qubit is chosen from { Z , X }, then the message is 
denoted as “ACK”. Otherwise if the unitary operation is H , then it is “H”. For 
a particular pair of qubits, there will be four possible cases {ACK, H}, {H, 
ACK}, {ACK, ACK}, {H, H}. 
Step.5 Based on the messages of the unitary operations performed on the qubit pairs, 
two groups can be identified in all qubit pairs. 
Group 1. With H  operation  
This group includes three cases {ACK, H}, {H, ACK}, {H, H}. For all 
the qubit pairs in this group, Alice and Bob have to reveal the exact operation 
z  or x  in the ACK to each other. With this information, Alice (Bob) can 
detect the existence of an eavesdropper (including a malicious TP). For 
example, for the ith  qubit pair, if the first qubit is performed with z  and 
the second qubit is performed with H , then according to Figure 1, the MR i  
should be either +  or - . If the corresponding MR i  does not satisfy 
the state transition diagram shown in Figure 1, Alice and Bob will terminate 
the protocol and start from the beginning. 
Group 2. Without H  operation 
This group only includes the case {ACK, ACK}. In this case, Alice (Bob) 
can obtain raw key bits by distinguishing the exact unitary operation in the 
ACK. For example, for a Bell Measurement result  + , if Alice performed 
z  on the first qubit of this Bell state, then by Figure 1, she knows that Bob 
also performed z  on the second qubit of this Bell state. Similarly, for a 
Bell Measurement result  − , if Bob performed x  on the second qubit of 
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the Bell state, then he knows that Alice performed z  on the first qubit of 
this Bell state. There will be four possibilities ( ,z z  ), ( ,z x  ), ( ,x z  ), 
( ,x x  ) which can be encoded respectively into one bit classical information 
“0”, “0”, “1”, “1”, correspondingly and will be treated as raw key bits. 
Step.6 Alice and Bob will choose half of the key bits and disclose the values to check 
the eavesdroppers. If the error rate is higher than a predefined threshold, Alice 
and Bob will abort the protocol. Otherwise, they perform the privacy 
amplification [31,32] on the remained raw key bits to obtain the session key. 
3. Security analyses  
In this section, we will show the robustness of the proposed protocol. Robustness is 
introduced first by Boyer et al. [15,16] and means that an eavesdropper cannot obtain 
any information about the raw key without risking detection. In terms of security 
analysis, collective attack is a particularly important class of attacks because it includes 
most of well-known attacks, such as measurement attack, intercept-resend attack and 
etc. Furthermore, collective attack is the strongest joint attack (the most general attack) 
[33]. To prove the proposed protocol is robust, we have to prove that proposed protocol 
can be secure against the collective attack. 
Collective attack 
With the collective attack, the attacker will perform specific unitary operators to 
entangle an ancillary particle for each qubit. Then, the attacker measures the ancillary 
qubits to obtain useful information. We assume that TP is the attacker (Eve) because TP 
has more authority than other eavesdroppers in the protocol. If the proposed protocol 
can resist collective attack from the malicious TP, it can also resist the attack from other 
eavesdroppers. In this section, we want to prove that the attacker cannot obtain useful 
information without being detected. That is, if the attacker wants to obtain useful 
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information, the attacker will introduce a detectable interruption to the original system 
and the attack will be detected. 
Theorem 1: The proposed LMQKD is robust under collective attack.  
Proof: We assume that TP generates the ancillary qubits 
1 2{| ,| ,...}E E E=     and 
performs a unitary operation 1U  on each qubit in Step 1. After Alice (Bob) finishing 
the operations in Step 2, TP performs another unitary operation 2U  on each qubit sent 
from Alice and Bob. Then TP can measure the ancillary qubits to obtain the 
measurement results and deduce the values of the shared key bits with the information 
of the ancillary qubits. First, we define 1U  operation and 2U  operation as follow:  
+
1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4| | | | | | | | | |AB EU E a e a e a e a e    
+ + − −   =   +   +   +       Eq. (1) 
where 1| E   denotes the initial state of ancillary qubit;
2 2 2 2
1 2 3 4| | | | | | | | 1a a a a+ + + = ; 
1| e  , 2| e  , 3| e   and 4| e   are four states which are distinguishable to TP. 
- + -
2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
- - + -
2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
+ - + -
2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
-
2 2 1 1
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | |
AB E
AB E
AB E
AB E
U E A F A F A F A F
U E B G B G B G B G
U E C H C H C H C H
U E D K
    
    
    
 
+ +
+
+
+
   =   +   +   +  
   =   +   +   +  
   =   +   +   +  
   =   + - + -2 2 3 3 4 4| | | | | |D K D K D K    +   +  
Eq. (2) 
where 2| E   also denotes the initial state of ancillary qubit; 1| F   , 2| F   , 3| F   , 4| F   ,
1| G   , 2| G   , 3| G   , 4| G   , 1| H   , 2| H   , 3| H   , 4| H   , 1| K   , 2| K   , 3| K   , 4| K   
are sixteen states which are distinguishable to TP; 2 2 2 2
1 2 3 4| A | | A | | A | | A | 1,  + + + =
2 2 2 2
1 2 3 4| B | | B | | B | | B | 1,  + + + =
2 2 2 2
1 2 3 4| C | | C | | C | | C | 1 + + + =   and
2 2 2 2
1 2 3 4| D | | D | | D | | D | 1 + + + = . 
After Alice’s and Bob’s operations, TP computes all possible equations in Group 1 and 
Group 2 (Step 5) by Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). 
Alice performs z and Bob performs z : 
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+
2 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 2
- + -
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- + -
2 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
- + -
3 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
( | | | | | | | | ) |
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                               .   3
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Alice performs z  and Bob performs x : 
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- + -
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Alice performs x  and Bob performs z : 
+ -
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- + -
4 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
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Alice performs x  and Bob performs x : 
- +
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Now, TP has all possible equations after 2U  operation in key case (Group 2), then TP 
needs to compute the equation in check case (Group 1) to get the limitation of ancillary 
qubits (Note that the limitation from the Group 1 are the same, so in our case we only 
take one scenario for illustration ).  
Alice performs H  and Bob performs H : 
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From Eq. (7), TP must set 
1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 1 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3| | | | | | | |a A F a B G a C H a D K a A F a B G a C H a D K +  +  −  =  +  +  −    
1 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4| | | | 0a A F a B G a C H a D K=  +  +  −  =   to pass the Alice and Bob’s 
detection. Then TP can get the condition: 2 2 2 2|  | ,A F D K =  3 3 3 3| | ,A F D K =    
4 4 4 4| |A F D K =   , 2 2 3 3 4 4| | |  andB G B G B G =  =   2 2 3 3 4 4| | |C H C H C H =  =    Next, 
TP would substitute the deduced limitation in Eq. (3-6) to get the following equations: 
+
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4 1 1 4 4
( | | | | )
 ( | | | | )
 ( | | | | )
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 
 
 
+
+
+
+
  +  
+   +  
+   +  
+   +  
                             Eq. (9) 
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+
+
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+
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                             Eq. (10) 
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2 1 1 4 4
( | | | | )
 ( | | | | )
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+
+
+
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                             Eq. (11) 
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+
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( | | | | )
 ( | | | | )
 ( | | | | )
 ( | | | | )
a A F A F
a B G B G
a C H C H
a D K D K
 
 
 
 
+
+
+
+
  +  
+   +  
+   +  
+   +  
                             Eq. (12) 
According to Eq. (9-12), because 2 2 2 2|  | ,A F D K =  3 3 3 3| | ,A F D K =    
4 4 4 4| |A F D K =  , TP could obtain the information about whether Alice’s and Bob’s 
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operations are the same or not. This information unfortunately is not useful in revealing 
the key bits in our protocol. In other words, though TP can perform the unitary operation 
𝑈1 and 𝑈2 (the operations that comply with the quantum mechanical theorems) to 
attack all transmitted qubits, there is no unitary operation for TP to obtain information 
about the participants’ secret key without being detected. 
4. Comparisons 
This subsection compares the proposed MQKD protocol to the other existing 
MQKD protocols which are also three-party QKD with untrusted TP (see also Table 2). 
In Shih’s protocol [34,35], it allows the participants to perform three quantum 
operations including reordering the qubits. However, in proposed protocol, it allows the 
participants to perform only two simple quantum operations. It is obvious that the 
proposed protocol is more lightweight for participants’ burden of quantum operations 
than theirs. Furthermore, in Krawec’s and Liu’s protocols, the participants have to 
reflect, generate, measure and reorder the single photons. These quantum operations 
are more difficult in implementation than performing lightweight quantum unitary 
operations according to the order of lightweight quantum operations discussed in Sec. 
1. In terms of the qubit efficiency which is defined by the following formula:
s
t
b
QE
q
= , 
where the parameter sb  denotes the number of shared key bits in the end. And the 
parameter tq  denotes the number of the total particles used in the protocol. For 2m  
shared session key bits, the proposed protocol need to generate 9m  pairs of Bell States, 
m Z + . The qubit efficiency of the proposed protocol is 
1
9
. On the other hand, and 
the qubit efficiencies of Shih’s scheme [34-35], Krawec’s scheme [26] and Liu’s 
scheme [27] are 
1
2
, 
1
24
 and 
1
8
, respectively. 
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Table 2. Comparison with other existing mediated QKD protocols 
 
4. Conclusions 
This study defines a new lightweight quantum environment allowing lightweight 
participants with only very lightweight quantum operations to perform quantum 
protocols. In particular, a Lightweight Mediated QKD (LMQKD) which allows the 
lightweight quantum users to perform only: (1) unitary operations and (2) reflecting 
qubits is proposed. The qubit efficiency of the proposed protocol is better than Krawec’s 
SQKD protocol, and the participants’ quantum capabilities are even more lightweight 
than Bob’s in BB84 protocol and other SQKD protocols. That is, the proposed LMQKD 
 
Improved Shih’s 
[34,35] 
Krawec’s  
[26] 
Liu’s 
[27] 
Proposed protocol 
 
Protocol type 
 
 
 
Ordinary quantum 
 
 
 
Semi-quantum 
 
 
 
Semi-quantum 
 
 
 
Lightweight quantum 
 
 
TP’s quantum 
capabilities 
1.Perform Z-basis 
measurement 
2. Prepare the single 
photon in X basis 
1.Perform Bell 
measurement 
2.Prepare the 
Bell states 
1.Perform Bell 
measurement 
2.Prepare the Bell 
states 
1.Perform Bell 
measurement 
2.Prepare the Bell 
states 
Participant’s 
quantum 
capabilities 
1.Unitary operations 
2. Reflect 
3. Reorder 
1.Measure 
2.Prepare 
3.Reflect 
1. Prepare 
2. Reflect 
 3.Reorder 
1.Unitary operations 
2. Reflect 
Qubit resource Single photons Bell states 
 
Single photons 
Bell states 
Bell states 
Robustness 
Security Proof 
 
No 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Qubit 
efficiency 
1
2
 
1
24
 
1
8
 
1
9
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protocol is practical in terms of the protocol implementation. Furthermore, the security 
analysis is given to prove that the proposed LMQKD protocol has the robustness 
property under the collective attacks. Whether the quantum burden of the participant 
can be further decreased? Can the other applications be proposed in the lightweight 
quantum environment? These will be our future work.  
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